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Abstract
Parallel distributed systems are widely used for dealing with massive data sets and
high performance computing. Securing parallel distributed systems is problematic. Cen-
tralized security tools are likely to cause bottlenecks and introduce a single point of failure.
In this paper, we introduce existing distributed authentication and authorization tools. We
evaluate the quality of the security tools by verifying their security and performance.
For security tool verification, we use process calculus and mathematical modeling
languages. Casper, Communicating Sequential Process (CSP) and Failure Divergence Re-
finement (FDR) to test for security vulnerabilities, Petri nets and Karp Miller trees are
used to find performance issues of distributed authentication and authorization methods.
Kerberos, PERMIS, and Shibboleth are evaluated. Kerberos is a ticket based dis-
tributed authentication service, PERMIS is a role and attribute based distributed autho-
rization service, and Shibboleth is an integration solution for federated single sign-on au-
thentication. We find no critical security and performance issues.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Parallel distributed computing, a.k.a high performance computing, has been used
to solve many important compute-intensive problems such as quantum physics, weather
forecasting, climate research, molecular modeling, or nuclear weapon simulations. Hard-
ware components of supercomputers are not different from those of personal computers,
since modern parallel distributed systems are made up of multiple servers using commodity
hardware for cost efficiency. Performance is achieved by interactions between hundreds to
millions of computing nodes.
Although the computing power of parallel distributed system is strong enough,
slower storage nodes or bottlenecks on the communication between them can harm over-
all system performance. Therefore, larger and faster file systems are required for modern
high performance computing. Distributed file systems provide both high performance and
robust file access to parallel distributed system. Distributed file systems need to pay more
attention to possible security threats than do centralized file systems. Applying distributed
authentication and authorization could be a good solution for distributed file systems to
maintain security while delivering exabyte performance, but we must check whether ex-
isting authentication and authorization tools have any negative impact on performance or
security.
Distributed file system must assure security to prevent altering, forging or sniffing of
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data. Security requirements for parallel distributed systems are quite different from those
of personal computers even though the hardware components of supercomputers are made
of commodity hardware, and Linux is commonly used as an O/S, since centralized security
tools are likely to cause bottlenecks and introduce a single point failure.
Standardized cryptography protocols are typically more secure than newly proposed
concepts, mainly because they have been thoroughly peer reviewed. Most distributed sys-
tems on the internet have similar needs and a set of standardized tools has been developed
to fulfill the performance requirement of distributed file system. On the other hand, dis-
tributed approaches which rely on a single root of trust are almost certain to become a
performance bottleneck. We must check whether the authentication and authorization
tools have performance or security problems.
To secure the system, the security tools maintain security attributes. These security
attributes guarantee that:
• participants are authenticated; access rights are verified at session initiation and re-
voked as necessary;
• transactions cannot be repudiated;
• and a reliable audit trail of security events is maintained.
The network needs to provide a sensible integration of cryptographic primitives into
file system communications; guarding against man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks,
eavesdropping, and data tampering. Cryptographic primitives are needed for data at rest
security, especially when files move to tertiary storage. Authentication and authorization
tools typically rely on secure cryptographic key distribution protocols.
To verify security properties of a given security protocol, we use Communicating
Sequential Processes (CSP) formalisms [33, 51] as implemented in the Failure Divergence
Refinement (FDR) model checker. CSP is a mathematical framework for description and
analysis of systems with component interactions via message exchange. FDR is an auto-
mated model checker which can determine whether the security property is fulfilled or not.
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If not, a counter example is returned by FDR. Constructing the CSP model of a security
protocol is somewhat tricky. A compiler called Casper was developed [32] to ease model de-
velopment. With Casper, only high level information of a security protocol to be checked is
needed. Casper automatically constructs the CSP model for FDR. We use a three message
version of Needham-Schoroeder message exchange protocol as an example for proving the
validity of our security and performance verification methods.
The Petri net is a mathematical model for describing discrete distributed systems
and it has been widely used for performance analysis on different fields. Any event structure
that can be modeled by CSP can also be modeled by Petri nets. By evaluating the Petri
net model of security protocols, we measure the performance of security protocols. Karp
Miller tree of a stochastic Petri net (SPN) is identical to the underlying Petri net model.
By using the reachability tree, we can directly find deadlocks and livelocks.
We provide details on CSP, FDR, and Casper script used for our security verification
methods in chapter 3. In chapter 4 we discuss on the theories of Perti net and Karp-
Miller Tree used for performance verification. We briefly introduce Kerberos, PERMIS and
Shibboleth in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 shows how we implement the test software based on
the theories introduced in 3 and 4. Then, we show our results and conclusion in chapter 7
and 8.
1.1 Assumptions
We assume the storage system executes in an environment where low level commu-
nications security is assured. Address spoofing and message security are not relevant to
this work. The system either uses an architecture where these attacks are not feasible, or
security is provided by a lower level of the implementation stack. For example, a wide area
network implementation could use IPV6 with IPSec. In which case, the networking layer
secures the communications. We do not explicitly consider side-channel attacks, since these
vulnerabilities are orthogonal to this work. In environments where side-channel attacks are
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relevant, countermeasures, such as equalization of resource consumption, are usually best
handled using some combination of compiler technologies and the physical or MAC layers
of the architecture [10]. The specific assumptions we make are:
• File System
– System implementation does not introduce additional vulnerabilities.
– Storage nodes are not corrupted
– Eavesdropping on packets is not viable.
– Client nodes may be corrupted.
– Infinite number of servent nodes possible.
• Network
– No sniffing/spoofing.
– Channel security assured at another level of abstraction (e.g. IPSec or SSL/TLS).
• Security
– Client login on local node outside of scope.
– Side-channel attacks outside of scope.
– Data scavenging outside of scope.
– Physical attacks out of scope.
4
Chapter 2
Related Work
Exabyte-scale distributed file systems need to reliably store and retrieve informa-
tion at rates exceeding 1018 bytes per second. Reliable storage and retrieval implies system
enforcement of basic security guarantees. Since enforcing security guarantees is common
to all information processing systems, it is only reasonable to leverage existing security
enforcement tools. In this chapter, We skim over a brief overview on existing distributed
file systems, and related security art. It then proposes a general authentication and autho-
rization architecture for the proposed system.
2.1 Distributed File Systems
2.1.1 LWFS
The Light Weight File System (LWFS) controls access to file containers through
the use of capabilities that provide proof of authorization for file access. Capabilities are
provided by processes possessing the proper credentials. Credentials serve as proof of user
authorization by a trusted external mechanism. Credentials and capabilities may be trans-
ferred between processes as needed [45]. The LWFS architecture has authentication and
authorization servers that are separate from file storage servers [46]. This separation adds
extra components to the system architecture and may eventually be a performance bottle-
5
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neck.
2.1.2 PVFS
The Parallel Virtual File System (PVFS) is a high performance distributed file sys-
tem for Linux clusters. PVFS security is enforced through digital signing. PVFS metadata
contains the information needed to verify access rights. Metadata is retrieved once by a
client and then reused as needed. Authentication is performed first by the local operat-
ing system and then public key cryptography is used for authentication within PVFS. For
the sake of performance, X.509 and Assertion Markup Language (SAML) data structures
are not used. For non-repudiation, data signing is done using RSA [2]. For the sake of
performance, the RSA key lengths used are relatively short.
2.1.3 GPFS security
IBMs General Parallel File System (GPFS) is a high performance distributed file
system [50]. Security is maintained by using SSL and RSA public key authentication [3].
RSA public keys are provided to system administrators for mounting volumes. SSL typically
uses public key primitives to generate symmetric keys that are used to maintain security
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for the life of the session.
2.1.4 Lustre
Lustre is a massively parallel file system for Linux Clusters. Lustre [Su-Qin 2010]
supports two authentication mechanisms: Kerberos and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
[Braam 2004]. Kerberos uses a centralized authentication server that must be on-line contin-
uously. In its PKI implementation, X.509 certificates are generated by a trusted authority.
To access the file system, both the client and Metadata Server (MDS) exchange messages
and access an LDAP directory. The MDS then transmits information that the client can
use to access an Object Storage Target (OST).
2.1.5 Panasas file system
The Panasas file system uses a symmetric key approach within the Generic Security
Services Application Programming Interface (GSS-API). Multiple implementations could
be consistent with this Object-based Storage Device (OSD) standard. In [Ko 2006] an au-
thentication protocol is detailed with communications between six entities using a set of
seven hierarchical symmetric keys. [Leung 2006] has a different approach where multiple
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MDSs work in parallel to respond to client authentication requests. In [Leung 2006] MDSs
return access handles that are capabilities allowing clients to access OSD. A major vulnera-
bility to this approach is that both client and MDS start with an a priori known symmetric
key [Oldfield 2006a]. The compromise of any client would destroy the security model. In
addition, access revocation is problematic.
2.2 Related security art
Distributed system security is important for many applications. Multiple tools exist.
Most implement established standards. Standards are adapted after rigorous peer review.
It is preferable to rely on peer-reviewed security standards rather than new security con-
cepts whenever possible. New security concepts are frequently derided as security through
obscurity [Lam 2004]. They are often brittle and subject to flaws that the original designer
did not foresee. This section reviews the tools most relevant to the P2P file system.
Many standards exist for handling security credentials. These standards allow se-
curity systems to interact transparently. They reduce the need to implement parsers, error
checking, and other common support functions. Unfortunately, data structure standards
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are typically designed by committees seeking to foresee all possible eventualities. They are
often bloated, which may have performance implications for an Exabyte file system.
2.2.1 XML based data structures
Numerous security data structure standards have been issued by OASIS based on
XML. SAML is a data structure for exchanging authentication and authorization informa-
tion between security domains [Cantor 2005]. XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language) is a language for expressing access control policies. XRML (eXtensible rights
Markup Language) is a language for expressing access rights for digital content [XrML
2010]. XRML and XACML are very similar.
• Pros
– Strong authentication based on PKI
– Widely used as a standard
• Cons
– Single point of failure vulnerability: It requires continuous availability of a central
9
server.
– Heavy traffic bottleneck
– Heavy processing
– Attacker still can construct bad certificates.
2.3 Distributed systems authentication
This brief discussion of distributed authentication standards will mention the major
tools; presented roughly in chronological order. We concentrate on the aspects of each tool
that are most relevant to this project.
2.3.1 Kerberos
Kerberos uses Needham-Schroeder key distribution [Needham 1978] to authenticate
users. To access a service, the client requests a ticket [Neuman 1994]. Since a centralized
authentication server must be continuously available, Kerberos would introduce a single
point of failure to this system and would quickly become a performance bottleneck. Further
discussions on Kerberos will continue in section 6.
• Pros
– Less computing power if it only uses symmetric keys.
– Flexible on cryptography
• Cons
– Designed for trustworthy server-client models, not for P2P system.
– Heavy traffic bottleneck.
– Vulnerability on symmetric key encryption: if one key has been lost, whole system
will be vulnerable in certain amount of time.
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– Single point of failure vulnerability: It requires continuous availability of a central
server.
– Kerberos has strict time requirements, which means the clocks of the involved
hosts must be synchronized within configured limits.
2.3.2 PGP Web of trust
The PGP web of trust tries to remove the need for a single root of trust and cen-
tralized authentication servers. In this approach, public key certificates are signed by many
authorities that attest to their validity [Blaze 1996]. As long as each participant is dili-
gent in verifying user identity, this process should be robust. Problems exist with collusion
attacks [Lenstra 2005], certificate revocation, and users with disjoint sets of colleagues.
• Pros
– Strong authentication based on PKI
– Good for decentralized network
– Less or no traffic bottleneck
– Easy to manage
• Cons
– Attackers also can make fake public keys and issue them.
– PGP methods still require a lot of processing power.
2.3.3 Group keys with key management trees
An alternative to both the use of public keys and the need for a continuously avail-
able centralized server is the use of binary key trees [Poovendran 1999, Pillai 2006, Brooks
2007, Brooks 2007a, Brooks 2009] for key management. The entire workgroup shares a
common symmetric key for securing communications. A binary tree structure of Key-
Encryption-Keys (KEK) is created where each client is a leaf node and there is a symmetric
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KEK associated with each node of the tree. Each of the n clients therefore has to store
keys. The key management server refreshes the communications keys periodically using
messages secured using the KEK. It is possible to efficiently revoke system access for any
subset of clients by modifying the group key and excluding that subset of clients. In [Pillai
2006], we show how this can be securely implemented for a set of peer nodes to combat
cloning, Sybil, and Byzantine Generals attacks. If key management nodes have overlapping
sets of clients, it is possible to detect malfeasance by an isolated key management node.
The use of secure key server selection schemes [Pirretti 2005, Pirretti 2006] can also make
this approach immune to collusion attacks.
• Pros
– Fast key encryption and decryption
– Distributed authentication.
– Less bottlenecks on network.
– Good for distributed system.
• Cons
– Not good for unstructured P2P.
– Vulnerability on symmetric key encryption: if one key has been lost, whole system
will be vulnerable in certain amount of time.
2.3.4 LDAP
X.509 was designed to define secure identifier entries in a universal X.500 (DAP)
directory system for the X.400 messaging system. The X.500 and X.400 standards were
never fully implemented. LDAP (Lightweight DAP) is a distributed directory system that
implements major portions of the X.500 standard [Howes 1995]. It forms a bridge between
the ITU and IETF standards families. LDAP can be used as a tool for organizing and
retrieving authorization information [Wahl 2000]. LDAP communications use TCP, which
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may be secured using either TLS or Kerberos. The use of TCP may be problematic in
this application. The rest of the file system is expected to be based on UDP to allow more
flexibility. LDAP is also subject to injection attacks that may result in data disclosure,
modification of the LDAP directory, and corruption of LDAP data [Alonso 2008]. The
LDAP design has also been criticized for not maintaining referential integrity [Blaha 2005].
• Pros
– LDAP directory can be accessed from any computing platform.
– LDAP servers are simple to install, easily maintained, and easily optimized.
– LDAP servers can replicate either some or all of their data via push or pull
methods, allowing you to push data to remote offices, or increase security.
– LDAP allows users delegate read and modification authority based on ACL.
• Cons
– It is not well suited for storing data where changes are frequent.
2.3.5 DIAMETER
DIAMETER is an authentication and authorization protocol that is the successor to
RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service). It relies on TCP sessions secured
using either TLS or an existing IPsec tunnel [Calhoun 2003]. TLS vulnerabilities based on
X.509 infrastructure are discussed in [Brooks 2010]. Similarly, IPsec may be vulnerable to
X.509 issues and is very vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks [Nikov 2006]. Each hop of
the base DIAMETER protocol is secure, but unless the end-to-end variant is used proxies
can execute man-in-the-middle attacks. The DIAMETER node serves as a centralized
repository of authentication information.
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2.3.6 TACACS+
TACACS+ (Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System Plus) is a Cisco
proprietary access and authentication system [Cisco 2010]. TACACS+ and DIAMETER are
considered current authentication and authorization approaches. TACACS+ has a number
of security issues [Peslyak 2010]. It has integrity checking issues, is vulnerable to replay
attacks, its encryption can be compromised if session IDs are not unique, session collisions
can reveal passwords, and a lack of padding compromises password strength [Young 2004].
2.3.7 Shibboleth
Shibboleth is an Internet2 Middleware Initiative project that is for federated identity-
based authentication and authorization infrastructure based on SAML. Federated identity
allows for information about users in one security domain to be provided to other organiza-
tions in a federation [24]. This allows for cross-domain single sign-on and removes the need
for content providers to maintain user names and passwords [42].
• Pros
– Organizational Single Sign-on System
– Controlled Information Release
– Federated Access
– Virtual Identity Provider
• Cons
– Heavy traffic bottleneck.
– Single point of failure vulnerability: It requires continuous availability of a central
server.
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2.3.8 PERMIS
PERMIS supports the distributed assignment of both roles and attributes to users
by multiple distributed attribute authorities, unlike centralized assignment of roles to users.
PERMIS provides a cryptographically secure Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI)
using public key encryption technologies and X.509 attribute certificates to maintain user
attributes [Chadwick 2003]. PERMIS does not provide any authentication mechanism, but
leaves it up to the application to determine what to use. (In earlier version, PERMIS only
supported X.509) Currently, PERMIS uses LDAP as a network accessible repository for
storing policies and credentials [Permis 2010]. PERMIS does not do authentication, but
may be integrated with authentication systems, such as DIAMETER or Shibboleth. We
further discuss Permis as our proposed authorization tool in section 5.
• Pros
– PERMIS can be integrated into virtually any application and any authentication
scheme like Shibboleth (Internet2), Kerberos, username/passwords, and PKI.
– Less computing power than PGP.
– Less bottlenecks on network.
– Good for P2P system by distributed authorization servers.
– It directly support XACML and SAML
• Cons
– No authentication mechanism exists. It should be used with other methods, but
it may require more computing power than other single security mechanism.
– Vulnerability on symmetric key encryption: if one key has been lost, whole system
will be vulnerable in certain amount of time.
– LDAP vulnerability
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PKI Kerberos Athens
Authentication
Mechanism
Digital certificates /
signatures
Tickets Usernames
Single Sign On Proxy certificates Can be provided Partial through
usernames
Authentication
Delegation
Through proxy
certificates
Cross-realm trust
configurations
Not provided
Authentication
Usability
Cumbersome process of
acquiring, using and
managing the certificate
User friendly as the
process of ticket
generation is hidden from
user
User-friendly process of
getting Athens usernames
Table 2.1: Comparision of Distributed Authentication Tools
W. Jie et. al. compared the distributed authentication and authorization tools in
[29]. We examine the paper to compare and decide which security tools are appropriate to
our design purpose. The table 2.1 and 2.2 are from the paper.
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Grid-map file CAS VOMS PERMIS Akenti
Authorization
Model
User identity Role Attribute Attribute Attribute
Authorization
Mode
Distributed Centralized
(CAS server)
Centralized
(VOMS server)
Distributed Distributed
Authorization
Delegation
No Partially Partially Yes Yes
Authorization
Granularity
Coarse-grained Fine-grained
when each SP
defines
fine-grained
policy
Fine-grained
when each SP
defines
fine-grained
policy
Multi-grained Multi-grained
Performance
Scalability
Not good
(scalability
issue)
Not good (SPF
& Scalability
issue)
Better than
CAS
Good Good
Authorization
Manageabil-
ity
Manage whole
grid-map &
heavy load
Need
fine-grained
policies
Need
fine-grained
policies
Independent
role-based
management
Achieved using
delegation
capabilities
Authorization
Usability
Easy-to-use but
lack of policy
expression
Plain extension
to proxy
certificates
Not addressed Easy-to-use in
XML
GUI interface
Credential
Confidential-
ity
Not applicable Kept &
managed by
Authorization
Infrastructure
Kept &
managed by
Authorization
Infrastructure
Kept &
managed by
Authorization
Infrastructure
Kept &
managed by
Authorization
Infrastructure
Communication
Confidential-
ity
TLS/MLS SAML SAML SAML/XACML SAML
Table 2.2: Comparision of Distributed Authorization Tools
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Chapter 3
Security Verification
Security protocols are designed to assure a set of security properties; confidentiality,
authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, anonymity, access control, availability [10]. The
protocols involve cryptographic operations such as hash functions, encryption, and digital
signatures. Some protocols such as TLS, Kerberos and AAA may require the participation
of a third trusted party. They always assume the underlying cryptographic mechanisms are
perfect, but we need to ensure the protocols are valid.
Security protocol validation has been an active research topic. Much of this work
uses various types of logic, such as BAN-logic [58, 35, 57, 25], linear temporal logic [19],
and other variants [9, 16, 17, 18]. Using logic, it is possible to check whether or not a
security protocol provide required security. If it fails to provide a security property, usually
a counter example will be generated.
Another way to analyze security prosperities utilizes CSP [33, 51, 55, 53, 48] and
the FDR model checker. CSP, proposed by C. A. R. Hoare in 1985 [28], is a mathematical
framework for describing and analyzing systems consisting of components interacting via
the exchange of messages [28, 47, 52]. FDR is an automated model checker [1].
For analyzing a security protocol against a given security property, a CSP model of
the security protocol is created, which include message flows of the security protocol, the
security property to be checked, and intruders with explicit capabilities, such as eavesdrop-
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0.    -> A : B 
1.  A -> B : {na, A}{PK(B)} 
2.  B -> A : {na, nb}{PK(A)} 
3.  A -> B : {nb}{PK(B)}  
 
-- Secrets in the protocol 
ALL_SECRETS_0 = Nonce 
ALL_SECRETS = addGarbage_(ALGEBRA_M::applyRenamingToSet(ALL_SECRETS_0)) 
 
-- Define type of signals, and declare signal channel 
datatype Signal =  
  Claim_Secret.ALL_PRINCIPALS.ALL_SECRETS.Set(ALL_PRINCIPALS) | 
  Running1.HONEST_ROLE.ALL_PRINCIPALS.ALL_PRINCIPALS.Nonce.Nonce |  
Commit1.HONEST_ROLE.ALL_PRINCIPALS.ALL_PRINCIPALS.Nonce.Nonce | 
  RunCom1.ALL_PRINCIPALS.ALL_PRINCIPALS.Nonce.Nonce.Nonce.Nonce | 
  Running2.HONEST_ROLE.ALL_PRINCIPALS.ALL_PRINCIPALS.Nonce.Nonce |  
Commit2.HONEST_ROLE.ALL_PRINCIPALS.ALL_PRINCIPALS.Nonce.Nonce | 
  RunCom2.ALL_PRINCIPALS.ALL_PRINCIPALS.Nonce.Nonce.Nonce.Nonce 
 
channel signal : Signal 
Fact_1 =  
  Union({ 
    {Garbage}, 
    Agent, 
    Nonce, 
    PublicKey, 
    SecretKey, 
    {Encrypt.(PK__.(B), <na, A>) | 
       A <- Agent, B <- Agent, na <- Nonce}, 
    {Encrypt.(PK__.(A), <na, nb>) | 
       A <- Agent, na <- Nonce, nb <- Nonce}, 
    {Encrypt.(PK__.(B), <nb>) | 
       B <- Agent, nb <- Nonce} 
  }) 
Sequence Diagram 
A B
{na, A}PK(B)
{na, nb}PK(A)
{nb}PK(B)
Casper Script CSP 
FDR Result 
Figure 3.1: Security verification procedure of Needham-Schroeder protocol using Casper,
CSP, and FDR
ping, forging, password cracking, and so on. Once the protocol is described by CSP, FDR
can analyze the effect of possible threats on the protocol. The result of FDR is that the
security property is either fulfilled or failed. If failed, a counter example is returned.
Casper is a script language developed for constructing CSP code for a security
protocol[49]. With Casper, only a high level description of a security protocol is needed.
Casper automatically constructs FDR code. Figure 3.1 shows how security analysis can be
done with Casper, CSP, and FDR. In this section, we explain our security analysis proce-
dures using a simple example of Needham-Schroeder message exchange protocol, introduced
in [41].
The security verification procedure is as follows. First we gather cryptography
and message passing information from design documents, source codes, and papers, From
this information, we can draw a sequence diagram of the security protocol. Then, Casper
scripts of the security protocol can be written based on the sequence diagram. Next, we
compile Casper scripts to translate them into CSP. Security protocols written in CSP can
be analyzed by FDR. The sequence diagram will also be used for performance analysis.
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3.1 Casper
The Casper scripting language and its compiler were first introduced by G. Lowe
in [32]. The scripting language is designed for describing security protocols in a simple,
intuitive, and abstract notation. The Casper compiler translates Casper Script into CSP.
3.1.1 Casper script
Casper script consists of eight different sections to precisely describe protocols. Each
section starts with ‘#’ notation. We show an example Needham-Schroeder protocol from
[34]. Full Casper script of the protocol shown in figure 3.1 is listed as follows.
−− Needham Schroeder Publ ic Key Protocol , 3 message ve r s i on
#Protoco l d e s c r i p t i o n
0 . −> A : B
1 . A −> B : {na , A}{PK(B)}
2 . B −> A : {na , nb}{PK(A)}
3 . A −> B : {nb}{PK(B)}
#Free v a r i a b l e s
A, B : Agent
na , nb : Nonce
PK : Agent −> PublicKey
SK : Agent −> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (PK, SK)
#Proce s s e s
INITIATOR(A, na ) knows PK, SK(A)
RESPONDER(B, nb) knows PK, SK(B)
#Sp e c i f i c a t i o n
Sec r e t (A, na , [B ] )
Sec r e t (B, nb , [A] )
Agreement (A,B , [ na , nb ] )
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Agreement (B,A, [ na , nb ] )
#Actual v a r i a b l e s
Al ice , Bob , Mallory : Agent
Na , Nb, Nm : Nonce
#Functions
symbol ic PK, SK
#System
INITIATOR( Al ice , Na)
RESPONDER(Bob , Nb)
#Int ruder In format ion
Int ruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Alice , Bob , Mallory , Nm, PK, SK(Mallory )}
We introduce the role of each section and the Casper syntax used in this example.
Please refer to [32, 34] for detailed Casper syntax. The line which starts with ‘–’ is a com-
ment line and ignored by Casper. The script has two parts; protocol description and system
definition. The protocol description defines the security and communication protocol. It has
four individual sections; protocol description, free variables, processes, and specification.
#Protoco l d e s c r i p t i o n
0 . −> A : B
1 . A −> B : {na , A}{PK(B)}
2 . B −> A : {na , nb}{PK(A)}
3 . A −> B : {nb}{PK(B)}
“#Protocol description” models the message flow in Figure 3.1. In this model, we
assume that A is a client, and B is a server. -> represents message flow direction. “0. ->
A : B” is included to start the protocol, representing that the client A obtains the identity
of server B from the environment. Message “1. A -> B : {na, A}{PK(B)}” means client A
sends server B a nonce na and B’s identity encrypted by server B’s public key. Since the
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three message version of Needham-Schroeder protocol uses public key encryption and each
agent has its own secret key, the message sent by A can be decrypted by B using B’s secret
key. The nonce is a random number that is used only once [41]. Message 2 and 3 use the
same notation with message 1. “2. B -> A : {na, nb}{PK(A)}” means B sends na and
newly generated nb encrypted by A’s public key. Message “3. A -> B : {nb}{PK(B)}” is
for B to confirm the nonce nb generated by B itself.
#Free v a r i a b l e s
A, B : Agent
na , nb : Nonce
PK : Agent −> PublicKey
SK : Agent −> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (PK, SK)
“#Free variables” is a variable list which includes agents as servers or clients, nonces
for cryptographic messages, and cryptographic keys for encryption and decryption. “Inverse
Key = (PK, SK)” means the system uses asymmetric key cryptography.
#Proce s s e s
INITIATOR(A, na ) knows PK, SK(A)
RESPONDER(B, nb) knows PK, SK(B)
“#Processes” shows various information on the agents of the protocol using plain
English statements. The statements in the example show who knows which cryptographic
keys.
#Sp e c i f i c a t i o n
Sec r e t (A, na , [B ] )
Sec r e t (B, nb , [A] )
Agreement (A,B , [ na , nb ] )
Agreement (B,A, [ na , nb ] )
The security properties to be checked are specified in “#Specification”. We check
the secrecy of na and nb. “Secret(A, na, [B])” means that “A thinks that na is a secret that
can be known to only himself A and B”. Agreement lines are for agreement authentication
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specifications; that A . “Agreement(A,B,[na,nb])” means “If A completes a run of the
protocol, apparently with B, then B has been running the protocol, apparently with A:
further, the two agents agree upon the roles each took and upon the values of the nonces
na and nb; and there is a one to one relationship between such runs of A and those of B.”
[49]
The system definition part describes which agents should be tested against which
malicious attacks. The part includes four sections; actual variables, functions, the system,
and the intruder.
The “#Actual variables” section defines which items should be dealt with on the
security verification. In this system, the FDR software verification tool checks three agents
and three nonces.
#Actual v a r i a b l e s
Al ice , Bob , Mallory : Agent
Na , Nb, Nm : Nonce
The “#Function” section describes any functions used by the agents in the protocol
description. “symbolic” means that Casper generates its own values to show the result of
the function applications.
#Functions
symbol ic PK, SK
The “#System” section defines who will have the role of initiator, responder, or
server in the protocol. In addition, it defines who uses what in the protocol. For example,
“INITIATOR(Alice, Na)” means that initiator Alice will use Na in the protocol.
#System
INITIATOR( Al ice , Na)
RESPONDER(Bob , Nb)
In the script, the ”#Intruder Information” section models the capacity of an at-
tacker. It suggests that the attacker compromises a legitimate user and obtained that
user’s credentials, including the secret key.
#Intruder In format ion
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Figure 3.2: Compilation result of Needham-Schroeder protocol in Casper compiler
In t ruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Alice , Bob , Mallory , Nm, PK, SK(Mallory )}
3.1.2 Casper compiler
The Casper compiler runs over a Haskell compiler which generates functional pro-
gramming languages from abstract languages. The Casper compiler generates CSP code
from the Casper script which describe the protocols and verification model in abstract way.
Figure 3.2 shows the compilation result of Needham-Schroeder protocol.
3.2 CSP
CSP (Communication Sequential Processes), proposed by C. A. R. Hoare in [28], is
a process calculus for describing systems of multiple agents that communicate by passing
messages. CSP can describe theoretical problems that arise from concurrency. In [49], P.
Ryan and S. Schneider introduce how to formalize security properties by using CSP. In this
paper, we do not model security protocols using CSP. We use Casper to model a security
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protocol for security analysis since the CasperFDR tool can automatically generate CSP
code from Casper script. Refer to [28] for modeling using CSP. We discuss basic CSP and
introduce the similarity between CSP and Petri nets for performance analysis.
3.2.1 Basic building blocks of CSP
CSP has two classes of primitives; events, and processes. Events represent com-
munications or interactions, and processes represent fundamental behaviors. The simplest
example of CSP ”Stop” shows how each primitive can be used.
in→ out→ Stop
in and out are events, and Stop is a process. It means that if input occurs, and
output occurs then stop the procedure. Also, CSP provides various algebraic operators.
In this paper, we introduce some, but not all, operators for security protocol modeling.
Others are described in [28]. The prefix operator produces a new process from an event.
For example, a→ B produces process B when event a happens.
CSP provides choice operators. There are two different choice operators; deter-
ministic and non-deterministic. In this paper, we use only non-deterministic choice. The
nondeterministic choice operator, ‘u’ represents a choice between two component processes,
but does not allow the environment control over which component process will be selected.
For example,
(a→ A) u (b→ B)
behaves like either a→ A or b→ B.
The interleaving operator ‖ represents independent concurrent activity. The process
A ‖ B
means both A and B occurs simultaneously.
CSP provides more, but we use only the operators introduced above. CSP de-
scriptions of security protocols can be directly converted into Petri nets. A Petri net is a
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Sequence Diagram 
A B
{na, A}PK(B)
{na, nb}PK(A)
{nb}PK(B)
FDR Overall Result 
Counter Example as attacks (Casper notation) 
Figure 3.3: Needham-Schroeder protocol FDR test result
mathematical model for describing discrete distributed systems, which is an established tool
for performance analysis [20]. The CSP operators used for security properties validation
are similar to Petri nets. Details of Petri nets will be introduced in section 4.
3.3 FDR
FDR is an automated model checker [19] for analyzing a given security properties. A
CSP model of the security protocol includes the message flows of the security protocol, the
security property, and hostile intruders with explicit capacities, such as message dropping,
message modification, etc. The CSP model is fed into FDR. The FDR result is that the
security property is either fulfilled or not. If not, a counter example is returned.
We give an example analysis of the Needham-Schroeder protocol using Casper and
FDR. Figure 3.3 shows the security analysis result of Needham-Schroeder protocol three
message version.
The FDR result reveals that the 3 message Needham-Schroeder protocol has a se-
crecy vulnerability. The failure counter example follows.
Top l e v e l t r a c e :
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Al i c e b e l i e v e s Na i s a s e c r e t shared with Mallory
Bob b e l i e v e s Nb i s a s e c r e t shared with Al i c e
The in t rude r knows Nb
System l e v e l :
Casper> 0 . −> Al i c e : Mallory
1 . A l i c e −> I Ma l l o ry : {Na , A l i c e }{PK( Mallory )}
1 . I A l i c e −> Bob : {Na , A l i c e }{PK(Bob)}
2 . Bob −> I A l i c e : {Na , Nb}{PK( Al i c e )}
2 . I Ma l l o ry −> Al i c e : {Na , Nb}{PK( Al i c e )}
3 . A l i c e −> I Ma l l o ry : {Nb}{PK( Mallory )}
3 . I A l i c e −> Bob : {Nb}{PK(Bob)}
The in t rude r knows Nb
The example shows that the intruder Mallory performs man-in-the-middle attack.
He pretends to be Bob to Allice between them. Then he successfully steals the secret nb.
Also, the authentication of both A to B, and B to A has failed. The following example
reported by Casper shows how the intruder is taking the role of both Alice and Bob.
Checking a s s e r t i o n SECRET M : : SEQ SECRET SPEC
[T= SECRET M : : SYSTEM S SEQ
Attack found :
Top l e v e l t r a c e :
The in t rude r knows Nb
System l e v e l :
Casper> 0 . −> Al i c e : Mallory
1 . A l i c e −> I Ma l l o ry : {Na , A l i c e }{PK( Mallory )}
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1 . I A l i c e −> Bob : {Na , A l i c e }{PK(Bob)}
2 . Bob −> I A l i c e : {Na , Nb}{PK( Al i c e )}
2 . I Ma l l o ry −> Al i c e : {Na , Nb}{PK( Al i c e )}
3 . A l i c e −> I Ma l l o ry : {Nb}{PK( Mallory )}
3 . I A l i c e −> Bob : {Nb}{PK(Bob)}
The in t rude r knows Nb
Checking a s s e r t i o n AUTH1 M : : Authent icate
INITIATORToRESPONDERAgreement na nb [T= AUTH1 M : : SYSTEM 1
Attack found :
Top l e v e l t r a c e :
Bob b e l i e v e s he has completed a run o f the protoco l ,
tak ing r o l e RESPONDER, with Al ice , us ing data items Na , Nb
System l e v e l :
Casper> 0 . −> Al i c e : Mallory
1 . A l i c e −> I Ma l l o ry : {Na , A l i c e }{PK( Mallory )}
1 . I A l i c e −> Bob : {Na , A l i c e }{PK(Bob)}
2 . Bob −> I A l i c e : {Na , Nb}{PK( Al i c e )}
2 . I Ma l l o ry −> Al i c e : {Na , Nb}{PK( Al i c e )}
3 . A l i c e −> I Ma l l o ry : {Nb}{PK( Mallory )}
3 . I A l i c e −> Bob : {Nb}{PK(Bob)}
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Chapter 4
Performance Evaluation
In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of security protocols by using Petri
nets. Security protocols consist of cryptographic operations and communications among
parties. The Petri net model includes cryptographic operations and communication the
timing information. The model also includes system capacity issues, such as the number
of users the system can support at a time. By evaluating the Petri net model, we obtain
performance measures such as the average time to serve a user, the average time a user
spends on cryptographic operations or communications, etc.
Karp and Miller [31] proposed a method to construct the reachability tree. This
method guaranteed a finite reachability tree. The reachability graph is obtained by merging
the same markings in the reachability tree. Karp Miller tree of a stochastic Petri net (SPN)
is identical to the underlying Petri net model. By using the reachability tree, we can directly
find which node is in deadlock, and which nodes are in livelock. The performance evaluation
procedure is listed as follows:
1. Generate XML descriptions of security protocols from Casper-CSP models or sequence
diagrams.
2. Generate Petri-Nets.
3. Generate Karp-Miller Trees.
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Figure 4.1: Basic components and an example of Petri net model
4. Checking livelocks and deadlocks.
5. Find bottlenecks.
4.1 Petri nets
Petri nets were invented by C. A. Petri, to model and visualize behaviors depicting
parallelism, concurrency, synchronization, and resource sharing [20]. Petri net models are
used for computer architecture and automatic control. In this paper, we apply a Petri net
model to security protocols.
A Petri net consists of three components: places, transitions and arcs. Additionally,
we add tokens (or marks). A Petri net model with marks on places is called a marked Petri
net. Figure 4.1 shows basic components of Petri net model along with an example.
Bipartite graph with arcs between places (transitions) and transitions (places). The
number of places and/or transitions should be neither infinite nor zero [20]. The example
shown in Figure 4.1 is a Petri net representation of Needham-Schroeder consisting of 10
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places and 5 transitions. Pictorially, a place is represented by a circle and a transition is
represented by a box.
This paper uses the mathematical notation of the Petri net model introduced in
[30]. Each place P1 to P7 has its own initial marking. A mathematical representation of
Petri net is a 5-tuple {P, T, I, O,M0}, where
• P = {P1, P2, ...} is a finite set of places. For example, P of the example in Figure 4.1
is P = {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10}.
• T = {T1, T2, ...} is a finite set of transitions disjoint from P . For example, T of the
example in Figure 4.1 is T = {T1, T2, T3, T4, T5}.
• I is a finite set of input arcs which satisfies Ii ⊆ P × T .
• O is a finite set of input arcs which satisfies Oi ⊆ T × P .
• M0, initial marking is a non-negative vector of length |P | with each element repre-
senting the number of tokens at each place P . For example, M0 of the example in
Figure 4.1 is M0 = [1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0]
T .
A place Pi is called input or output of transition Tj , and Tj is called an upstream
or downstream transition of Pi when an arc (Tj , Pi)((Pi, Tj)) exists in a Petri net. For
example, T1 is an upstream transition of P4, and T3 is a downstream transition of P4. If
a transition does not have any downstream place, the transition is called to be a source
transition. In opposition, if a transition has no upstream place, the transition is called to
be a sink transition.
• ∏(Pi) ⊆ T : is a set of upstream transitions of place Pi.
• σ(Pi) ⊆ T : is a set of downstream transitions of place Pi.
• ∏(Tj) ⊆ P : is a set of input places of transition Tj ,
• σ(Tj) ⊆ P : is a set of output places of transition Tj .
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4.2 Similarity between CSP and Petri net
P. Sheldon, J. Deng and R. R. Brooks observed the similarities between CSP and
Petri net in [54, 23, 30]. The CSP operators shares many similarities with Petri net graphs.
CSP supports modeling sequential events, events recursion, events choice and events con-
currency, etc. Petri net can also support the same graph models. Figure 4.2 below shows
the corresponding modeling of some basic event structures in CSP and Petri nets.
4.3 Reachability and Karp Miller Trees
A transition can be fired only if all of the input places for this transition contain
at least one mark. Transition Tj is enabled by a Marking M if Mi > w(Pi, Tj) for all
Pi ∈
∏
(Ti). Firing the enabled transition Ti generates a new marking M¯
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Figure 4.3: Transition firing examples of Petri net model
M¯ =

Mi − w(Pi, Tj), if Pi ∈
∏
(Tj)
Mi + w(Tj , Pi), if Pi ∈ σ(Tj)
Mi, otherwise
M¯ is reachable from M . Figure 4.3 shows an example of firing of transition by the
firing rule mentioned above.
Places represent conditions and transitions represent events. Input places of a tran-
sition represent preconditions of the event, and Output places of a transition represent
postconditions of the event. The presence of token(s) at place Pi represents that the pre-
condition associated with Pi is fulfilled. At the initial state M0, both P1 and P2 have more
than one token. Thus, either T1 or T2 can be fired since the precondition of both T1 and T2
are fulfilled. As the result, state M0 produces M1 and M2. At the state M1, either T1 or T2
can be fired. If T1 is fired, M1 produces a new state M3, but if T2 is fired, the next state of
M1 becomes the same state as M0. Thus, it goes to M0 back. At the state M2, only T1 can
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be fired, and the next state of M1 becomes M0. Unless otherwise stated, the probability of
the transition each arc is 1.
The reachability of all nodes can be represented by a tree structure. The reachability
tree of Petri Net {P, T,W,M0} is a tree with nodes obtained as:
1. M0 is a node of this tree.
2. fire each enabled transition and obtain a new marking M¯ , and connect M0 and M¯ by
an arc.
3. for each M¯ , recursively perform step 2.
The reachability tree of Figure 4.3 is shown in Figure 4.4. The example has only
finite reachability, the tree has the exact same structure of Figure 4.3. The tree covers all
possible states of the Petri net model. Each state Mi has a set of markings of all places:
• M0 = {2, 1}
• M1 = {1, 2}
• M2 = {3, 0}
• M3 = {0, 3}
If a Petri net is not bounded, the reachability graph of the Petri net also has an
infinite number of nodes. The reachability tree constructed by the above procedures may
become infinite for some Petri nets, which make the analysis extremely difficult. Karp
Miller tree guarantees a finite reachability although the reachability of some nodes goes to
infinity. The Karp Millet tree is obtained by merging the same markings in the reachability
tree. To guarantee the finiteness of rechability graph, Karp Miller trees use ω to represent
an infinite number of tokens. The algorithm to produce finite nodes of Karp Miller tree
using ω is as follows:
1. M0 is a node of this tree.
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Figure 4.4: The reachability tree of the Petri net example
2. Fire each enabled transition and obtain a new marking M¯ , and connect M0 and M¯
by an arc.
3. If M¯i covers Mi (M¯i > Mi), then substitute the marking of M¯i which covers the
marking of Mi to ω.
4. If the markings of M¯i already exists as Mj in the reachability tree, merge M¯i with
Mj .
5. For each M¯ , recursively perform step 2.
4.4 Connectivity Matrix
One of our objectives in performance tests is finding deadlocks and livelocks of
the security tools. These performance problems can be detected by using the Petri net
of communication protocol models. To find the problems, we need to define connectivity
matrix of Karp Miller tree which shows all possible next states from the current state. In the
previous section we confirm that if the Perti net has a finite length, Karp Miller tree always
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have finite node length. From the finite length Karp Miller tree, we derive a connectivity
matrix. The connectivity matrix W can be defined as a n× n square matrix, such as:
W =

[r]a1,1 a1,2 a1,3 · · · a1,n
a2,1 a1,1 a1,1 · · · a1,n
a3,1 a1,1 a1,1 · · · a1,n
...
...
...
. . .
...
an,1 an,1 an,1 · · · an,n

When a Karp Miller tree has n nodes of . By using this connectivity matrix, we can
find the next state of Karp Miller trees. The current state of the Karp Miller tree is defined
as Mi = [m1m2m3 · · ·mn] where,
mk = 1 only if current state is at k-th node, otherwise mk = 0. (0 < k ≤ n ).
The next state Mi+1 is:
Mi+1 = Mi ×W
[m1,1m1,2m1,3 · · ·m1,n]+ = [m1,1m1,2m1,3 · · ·m1,n]

[r]w1,1 w1,2 w1,3 · · · w1,n
w2,1 w1,1 w1,1 · · · w1,n
w3,1 w1,1 w1,1 · · · w1,n
...
...
...
. . .
...
wn,1 wn,1 wn,1 · · · wn,n

Mi of the current state only has one 1 but Mi+1 can have multiple of 1s because the
vector shows the possibility of next states.
Then, we can find the possibility of M(i+ k) by multiplying k-times of W .
Mi+k = Mi ×W k
0 < k ≤ n The maximum of k is the length of the Karp Miller tree’s node n because
the longest path of node transitions is to pass all nodes.
4.5 Deadlocks and Livelocks
We can find deadlocks and livelock from:∑n
k=1W
k = W 1 +W 2 +W 3 + · · ·+W k
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If a row j of
∑n
k=1W
k has all ‘0’ where 0 < k ≤ n , it means that there is no
possibility to reach the node j. Therefore, the node j is a deadlock node. Livelocks can
also be found from
∑n
k=1W
k. If an wi,j 6= wj,i they are connected components, and wi,j
and wj,iare livelocks.
4.6 Bottleneck Analysis
A deterministic and stochastic Petri net (DSPN) may be seen as a seven-tuple
of {P, TD, TS ,W,M0, β,Λ}. {P, T,W,M0} is the underlying Petri net with T = TD ∪ TS .
There are two sets of transitions in a DSPN. TD is a set of transitions with determined firing
times specified in β and Ts is the set of transitions with variable firing times, which follow
exponential distribution with rates specified in λ. The firing rates may either be marking-
dependent or marking-independent. The average firing time of firing time of transition TSj
is 1/λj . Pictorially, transitions with constant firing times are drawn as a black boxes and
others are drawn as white boxes. The reachability graph of a stochastic Petri net is identical
to the underlying Petri net.
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Chapter 5
Distributed Authentication and
Authorization
Parallel distributed systems mostly deal with important data. The security require-
ments of the systems should be different from centralized systems since the centralized
security tools are likely to cause bottlenecks and have a possibility of single point failure
[10]. Many distributed security tools have been developed to keep the system from security
threats; Web of Trust [11], X.509 Public Key Infrastructure[8], WS-SecurityKerberos[40],
and so on[37, 26, 29].
The security tools help the system maintain important security attributes. The
fundamental security issues of parallel distributed systems are authentication and autho-
rization; participants are authenticated; access rights are verified at session initiation and
revoked as necessary [10].
In this chapter, we introduce Kerberos , PERMIS, and Shibboleth. We observe
cryptography protocols and communication procedures of each security tool, getting infor-
mation to build the sequence diagram as the starting point of security and performance
verification.
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5.1 Kerberos
Kerberos is a distributed authentication system, which was developed for the project
Athena workstation system to manage authentication of a distributed system[39]. This
authentication model relies on symmetric key exchange through the trusted third parties[41].
Key Distribution Center (KDC) which consists of authentication server (AS) and ticket
granting server (TGS), only knows the secret keys of all and issues tickets between its servers
via the client who wants to be authenticated[43, 39]. Since Kerberos can be configured with
multiple TGSs, and service servers, the system can support multiple realm authentication.
The basic assumption of the Kerberos is that session keys and the key management
servers must not be compromised. This ticket-based authentication system enables a client
to prove its identity without knowing the cryptography information of target server. Stan-
dard configuration of Kerberos uses two key management servers: AS and TGS. Also, two
independent tickets are used: TGS ticket and service ticket. The authentication process is
done by exchange tickets among a principal, KDC and service server (SS). Figure 5.1 shows
how the authentication process of Kerberos works.
The authentication procedure is as follows [43]:
1. As the first step, a user on the client enters the username and password on the client.
The client sends the log on authentication request with user name and encrypted
password to AS.
2. AS checks the password and log on information. If the log on information given by the
user is correct, then AS issues TGS ticket which is encrypted with the user’s password.
3. The client decrypts and verifies the ticket received. The ticket includes TGS ticket
but the TGS ticket is encrypted using the secret key of TGS. Thus, the client only
can get the client/TGS session key, and the server’s identity. The client sends the
TGS ticket and authenticator to TGS. The authenticator is the message which only
contains the identity of client, and timestamp.
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Figure 5.1: The system diagram of Kerberos
4. The TGS decrypts and verifies the TGS ticket and the authenticator. If all the
information is correct, TGS issues service a ticket which includes client/SS session
key. The ticket is encrypted with the secret key of the SS.
5. The client decrypts and verifies the service ticket. If it is correct, the client sends the
ticket and an newly generated authenticator encrypted with client/TGS session key
to SS.
6. The SS decrypts and verifies the ticket and the authenticator. If all information is
correct, the SS release client/SS session key encrypted with the client/TGS session
key.
Using symmetric keys, Kerberos has more advantages on cryptography speed and
less computing power over asymmetric key authentication services. Also, current version
of Kerberos can support PKI for session key exchange and ticket forwarding to allow the
request from non Kerberos server which is under the control of authenticated Kerberos
client. Configuring Kerberos with multiple domain and ticket delegation also increases
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distributed authentication performance, but the fact that Kerberos only allows a single AS
can cause traffic bottleneck.
5.2 PERMIS
PERMIS (PrivilEge and Role Management Infrastructure Standard), developed by
D. W. Chadwick [15], is a distributed authorization system which supports assignment
of both policy and attributes to users. PERMIS supports hierarchical role based access
controls in which policies are organized in a hierarchy and inheritance of policies.
PERMIS provides a Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) based on public key
cryptography and X.509 attribute certificates (ACs) to manage user attributes [14]. PER-
MIS does not provide any authentication mechanism, but the system can be integrated with
other existing authentication systems. Since PERMIS supports WS-Security, most types of
security tokens defined by WS-Security specification can be embedded into PERMIS ACs;
such as X.509 certificates, Kerberos, UserID/password credentials, and SAML assertions
[60].
A PERMIS authorization service is configured with many individual components.
This makes PERMIS look complicated, but it helps to achieve hierarchical, strict and precise
access controls. The individual components of PERMIS infrastructure are:
• Policy enforcement point (PEP) is a gateway for the authorization. Subject PEP
collects user certificates, attributes, and access control decision, or sends the access
control decision to object server. The communication for cross domain authorization
can be done by multiple PEPs.
• Policy decision point (PDP) makes authorization decisions based on the attributes
and access control policies. Decision making process contains two categories of rules,
trust related rules (Credential Validation Policy) and privilege related rules (Access
Control Policy). PDP informs PEP which policies to include with the user request.
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Figure 5.2: The system diagram of PERMIS
• Credential issuing service(CIS) verifies user information and issues certificates when
the user provides CIS with correct identity through client PEP.
• Credential validation service(CVS) verifies the user credentials received from target
PEP. CVS informs PEP which credentials from which issuing attribute authorities
(AA) are trusted by the object server. AA is an entity trusted by one or more entities
to create and sign ACs. A certification authority(CA) may also be an AA [5].
• Credentials and policies repository (CPR) uses LDAP as a network accessible reposi-
tory to store and manage policies including X.509 ACs. CPR sends the ACs to PDP
when they need to make authorization decision [12].
Figure 5.2 shows how PERMIS authorization process works over multiple domains.
The details of the authorization process are as follow:
1. The protocol starts from sending an access request from client user to client PEP. The
access request includes a set of attributes issued by AA.
2. The PEP send the ACs to PDP.
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3. PDP verifies the ACs. If the ACs are validated, the PDP informs client PEP which
policies to include with the user request.
4. Client PEP requests a new certificate to CIS.
5. CIS issues a new AC which includes the attributes of user and target resources.
6. Client PEP sends the user’s request with new ACs to target PEP.
7. Target PEP sends the ACs received from client PEP to CVS for credential validation.
8. CVS returns the validation result.
9. If the ACs are validated, PEP send the validated attributes along with date and time
stamp to the PDP for access control decision.
10. PDP returns access control decision.
11. If the decision is granted, the PEP allows the user access, otherwise the access is
rejected.
To manage complicated policies, PERMIS infrastructure provides GUI policy editor
for system administrator to easily compose and edit policies. Policies are written in XML
format with embedded X.509 ACs and stored into LDAP directories of CPR. PERMIS also
provides the attribute certificate manager(ACM) tool which allows administrators to create
new ACs or assign attributes to users. Administrator also can modify or revoke existing
ACs in LDAP repositories.
5.3 Shibboleth
Shibboleth is an integration solution for federated authentication and authorization,
developed as a middleware of Internet2 project. Similar to PERMIS, Shibboleth does not
provide any internal authentication service [42]. The objective of Shibboleth is achieving
single sign on and exchange of the authentication and authorization information among
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Figure 5.3: The system diagram of Shibboleth
the federated institutions[24]. To achieve this goal, Shibboleth provides related functionali-
ties such as federated administration, heterogeneous authentication systems, access control
based on attributes, and a strong emphasis on user-managed privacy [27].
The security protocols of Shibboleth relies on security assertion markup language
(SAML) for the communication security and data management[42]. SAML is a security
extension of extensible markup language (XML). In 2005, SAML 2.0 became an data ex-
change standard of organization for the advancement of structured information standards
(OASIS). SAML 2.0 supports both XML encryption and XML signature [4]. Shibboleth
uses only XML signature for SAML assertions and SAML profile to describe specific use
scenarios [27]. A simple configuration of Shibboleth includes an Identity provider (IdP)
which creates, manages, and verifies user certificates and attributes, and a service provider
(SP) which manages the restricted service. In order for Shibboleth to work, the IdP and
SP must trust each other [36]. Figure 5.3 shows the configuration of Shibboleth.
The authentication sequence is as follows:
1. Client sends a request and user attributes to access the restricted service provided by
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SP.
2. SP tries to find the certificates of the client. If the certificate does not exist in SP. SP
redirect the service request with attributes verification request to IdP.
3. Client sends the request packet to IdP.
4. IdP verifies the request. If the user attributes are valid, IdP redirects the service
request with verification result to SP.
5. Client sends send the request and verification results.
6. SP allows the client the restricted service.
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Chapter 6
Implementation
In this chapter, we apply the security verification and performance evaluation method-
ologies to Kerberos, PERMIS, and Shibboleth to find security vulnerability and performance
bottlenecks. To apply the test methodologies, we should clarify the cryptography methods
and communication processes of each security tool.
The CSP operators shares many similarities with PN graphs. CSP supports mod-
eling of sequential events, events recursion, events choice and events concurrency, etc. PN
also can support same graph models. However, modeling security protocols using CSP is
too complicated and prone to error as well as, converting from CSP to PN creates enormous
graphs to analyze the security protocol.
In chapter 3, we confirmed that sequence diagram can directly be converted into
Casper scripts. We also observed the similarities between sequence diagram and PN. Con-
verting sequence diagram directly to Casper scripts and PN graphs overcomes these disad-
vantages. Figure 6.3 shows the overall process of security and performance verification.
6.1 UML sequence diagram
We use sequence diagram of Unified Modeling Language (UML) 2.0 to clarify the
security and communication process specification. UML was developed for designing and de-
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0.    -> A : B 
1.  A -> B : {na, A}{PK(B)} 
2.  B -> A : {na, nb}{PK(A)} 
3.  A -> B : {nb}{PK(B)}  
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Figure 6.1: Overall process of security verification and performance evaluation
Notation Description
tx timestamp of entity x
Kx encryption key of entity x
Kx,y Session key between entity x and y
{M}Kx message M encrypted with key Kx
Table 6.1: Mathematical Notation for Security Protocols
scribing object-oriented program in software engineering. The sequence diagram of UML is
designed for modeling the interactions between objects or entities in the sequential order[7].
[44] shows how to use UML for designing a security model. Using the sequence diagram we
can describe both the communication processes and cryptography information of security
tools in a diagram. To represent security protocol using UML sequence diagram, we use
mathematical notation as shown in Table 6.1.
Several types of sequence diagrams exist, but we only use system level sequence
diagrams to describe cryptography information. More information on various sequence
diagram and how the system level sequence diagrams are different from service level sequence
diagrams can be found from [6].
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 shows the security
analyzation of each distributed authentication and authorization tool. The section mainly
explains sequence diagrams, Casper scripts of Kerberos, PERMIS, and Shibboleth. The
FDR results of the security protocols are dealt with in chapter 7. Section 6.3 shows how to
write the XML data structure designed for describing security protocols. It also explains
the design of the performance analysis program which generates PN graphs and Karp Miller
tree graphs from the XML data structure scripts. This section shows the PN graphs and
Karp Miller trees of Kerberos, PERMIS, and Shibboleth. The results of locating deadlocks,
livelocks, and bottlenecks of each protocol are shown in chapter 7.
6.2 Security verification
System level sequence diagram of UML can simply depict security protocols includ-
ing the information of communication process and cryptography information. Casper also
can precisely describe security protocols in abstract language, however writing casper scripts
without their sequence diagrams is prone to make errors. To reduce implementation errors,
we draw sequence diagram first. In section 6.3, we will use the sequence diagrams to write
XML protocol descriptions for each protocol.
6.2.1 Kerberos
In section 5.1, we summarized the service level protocol information of Kerberos,
but we need more information to describe the detail of cryptography information. The
cryptography information of real Kerberos protocol can be found in [56]. First we define
the server names used for the sequence diagram in table 6.2.
Kerberos uses two types of credentials; a ticket and an authenticator. Both are
used for the authentication between two entities. The difference between the ticket and the
authenticator is the lifetime. The ticket can be repeatedly used until the ticket expires, but
the authenticator can only be used once. The ticket contains both entity names, IP address
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Notation Description
C client name
AS authentication server name
TGS TGS server name
SS service server name
Table 6.2: Mathematical Notation used for Kerberos
of the client, a timestamp, a lifetime, and a random session key between the two entities.
In this paper, we do not use the IP address of the client, and lifetime of the key. This ticket
is encrypted with the key of destination entity. In Kerberos system, since the user of client
has only its own key, the user can pass the ticket but cannot decrypt the ticket. A ticket
Tx,y is for y to grant access control to x can be defined as follows;
Tx,y = {x, y, tx,Kx,y}Ky
x is the name of source entity, and y is the name of destination entity. tx represents
the timestamp of the ticket issuing time, and Kx,y is the random session key between x and
y. The ticket is encrypted with the secret key of y. The message structures of Kerberos
authenticator Ax can be defined as follows:
Ax,y = {x, tx}Kx,y
The authenticator should be encrypted with the session key between x and y. In this
paper, our authenticator includes only the name of source entity and the timestamp. The
authenticator is encrypted by the session key. Figure 6.2 shows the system level sequence
diagram of Kerberos adding the ticket and the authenticator information to the diagram
shown in Figure 5.1 of Chapter 5. The sequence diagram includes both communication
processes and cryptography messages. The communication procedure was described in
section 5.1.
As mentioned above, the sequence diagram can directly be translated into Casper
script. One problem is current version of Casper cannot compile a model with more than
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Service ServerTGSASClient (C)
C, TGS
TC,TGS, AC,TGS, SS 
{KC,TGS, TC,TGS}KC 
{KC,SS,TC,SS}KC,TGS
TC,SS, AC,SS 
Authentication Results
Figure 6.2: System level sequence diagram of Kerberos
three servers. We therefore break the communication protocol into several parts with over-
lapping. Kerberos can be divided into two parts. The full Casper scripts of Kerberos are
shown in Appendix D.
6.2.2 PERMIS
The service level descriptions was explained in section 5.2. We add cryptography
information of PERMIS into the sequence diagram to build the security verification model.
The cryptography information of PERMIS protocol can be found from [13, 21, 59, 22].
PERMIS uses two cryptography techniques; WS-TRUST security token and secure hash
function. WS-TRUST is used for credential validation of subject. and encrypted by public
key of CVS. Secure hash is used for digital signature of SAML attribute assertion. The
structure of SAML attribute structure is shown in Table 6.3.
The issuer field is optional. The entity name could be subject name or target
object name. Since PERMIS uses Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) based on digital
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Subject or Object Attribute ID Value Data Type Issuer
Table 6.3: The Structure of SAML Attribute Assertion in PERMIS [22]
Target PEPClient PEP Subject PDP
Resource(Target PEP, value, DataType), Subject(Client PEP, value, DataType)
Decision
Resource(Target PEP, value, DataType), Subject(Client PEP, value, DataType)
CIS
Resource(Target PEP, value, DataType), Subject(Client PEP, value, DataType), {WS-TRUST Token}{PKey(CVS)}
Resource(Target PEP, value, DataType), Subject(Client PEP, value, DataType), {WS-TRUST Token}{MD5}
CVS
{WS-TRUST Token}{MD5}
{WS-TRUST Token}{PKey(CVS)}
Result
Object PDP
Resource(Target PEP, value, DataType), Subject(Client PEP, value, DataType)
Decision
Access privilidge granted
Figure 6.3: System level sequence diagram of PERMIS
signature technology, the public key signature encrypted by secure hash function comes with
the attributes [14].
Converting the sequence diagram of PERMIS into Casper scripts need more tech-
niques than used in Kerberos. The Casper scripts of PERMIS require the implementation
of WS-TRUST token, and MD5 secure hash. We substitute the WS-TRUST token with
simple public key encryption, and MD5 hash with internal hash function. The commu-
nication protocol of PERMIS is divided into three parts and implemented. Figure 6.3 is
the system level sequence diagram of PERMIS based on the security information. The full
Casper scripts of PERMIS can be found in Appendix D.
6.2.3 Shibboleth
The service level description was explained in section 5.3. Shibboleth has only two
service entities; Identity provider (IdP) and Service provider (SP). The communication
message protocol and security is done by using SAML assertions. Shibboleth We add
cryptography information of Shibboleth into the sequence diagram to build the security
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EL samlp:Request MUST appear once and only once
ATT RequestID
ATT MajorVersion MUST equal “1”
ATT MinorVersion MUST equal “0”
ATT IssueInstant MUST equal the current GMT date and time
EL samlp:RespondWith* MAY appear zero or more times
MUST connote a SAML AttributeStatement, if used
EL ds:Signature? MAY contain an XML signature
MAY include an X.509 certificate
EL samlp:AttributeQuery
ATT Resource SHOULD contain the target URL, if applicable
EL saml:Subjectt Subject information
Table 6.4: Attribute Query Message (AQM) Common Syntax [24]
verification model. The document [24] written by M. Erdos contains detailed information
on Shibboleth communication protocol and message structure. Shibboleth uses two different
types of messages; attribute query message(AQM) and attribute response message(ARM).
All Shibboleth protocols must share the AQM and ARM. The structure of AQM and ARM
attribute structure is shown in table 6.4 and 6.5.
We only focus on the signature fields. The signature field contains X.509 certificate
or XML signature. We implement the signatures using public key signing. Figure 3 is the
system level sequence diagram of PERMIS based on the security information. The full
Casper scripts of Shibboleth can be found in Appendix D.
6.3 Performance Evaluation
For the performance test, we developed a test tool named “Performance Evaluation
Tools for Security protocols” (PETS). The program can generate Petri net graphs from
XML data structures and convert it into Karp Miller trees. The program can calculate the
number of deadlocks and livelocks of the Karp Miller Tree.
PETS software consists of three classes: [PETS], [PetriNet], and [KManalysis]
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EL samlp:Request MUST appear once and only once
ATT RequestID
ATT InResponseTo MUST equal RequestID in AQM
ATT MajorVersion MUST equal “1”
ATT MinorVersion MUST equal “0”
ATT IssueInstant MUST equal the current GMT date and time
EL ds:Signature? MAY contain an XML signature
MAY include an X.509 certificate
EL saml:Assertion
ATT AssertionID
ATT MajorVersion MUST equal “1”
ATT MinorVersion MUST equal “0”
ATT Issuer
ATT IssueInstant SHOULD equal
GMT date and time of statement generation
EL saml:AttributeStatement MUST appear once and only once
EL saml:Subject Subject information
EL saml:Attribute* Subject information
EL Isaml:Conditions
ATT NotBefore SHOULD be omitted, MUST be in the past
ATT NotOnOrAfter MAY be used to signify attribute expiration
EL ds:Signature? MAY contain an XML signature
MAY include an X.509 certificate
Table 6.5: Attribute Response Message (ARM) Common Syntax [24]
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User Agent Service Provider Identity Provider
GET / HTTP/1.1, SP
Cookie _sibstate_XXX
Location, _shibsessionXXX cookie, _saml_idp cookie
Respond to the first request : Location, _shibsessionXXX cookie, _saml_idp cookie
Location(IdP): shire, time, target, providerID(SP)
GET shire, time, target, providerID(SP)
Authorization: Basic, hash (credential)
HTTP1.1 200 OK
SessionID, Path
SP, action, Target(decrypted), Client authentication request(digital signed)
IdP, Cookie_sibstate_XXX(C), target, saml_idp_cookie
Location, _shibsessionXXX cookie, _saml_idp cookie
Figure 6.4: System level sequence diagram of Shibboleth
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classes. [PETS] class is the main class. The class has the functionalities as follow:
• Read petrinet XML data structures.
• Draw petrinet graphs from XML data structure.
• Generate Karph Miller trees from the petrinets using [KManalysis] class.
• Draw Karph Miller trees using [PetriNet] class.
The Petri net graphs and Karp Miller trees of each protocol can be found in Ap-
pendix B and C. The rest of the chapter shows the techniques that we used for evaluating
the performance of security tools.
6.3.1 XML data structure for protocol description
XML data structure makes it easier to design a complicated data base model. The
tagging style of XML looks similar to HTML, but XML allows any type of tags unlike
HTML [38]. In this paper, we define a data structure of XML for describing Petri net
graphs.
The data structure begins with < petrinet > and end with < /petrinet >. The
petrinet structure include two sections, < place > · · · < /place > are for defining place
nodes of Petri nets, < transition > · · · < /transition > are for transition nodes. The place
section includes < token > · · · < /token > which indicates that the number tokens the
place has. Each transition node of the the transition section has arc definitions. There are
two types of arcs: upstream and downstream. Upstream arcs are defined by < pfrom >
· · · < /pfrom >, and downstream arcs are defined by < pto > · · · < /pto >. The following
code is a part of Needham-Schroeder protocol that we have used as an example.
<?xml v e r s i on =”1.0”?>
<!−− Place d e f i n i t i o n −−>
<pe t r in e t>
<!−− Cl i en t Node −−>
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<place>
<pname>1</pname>
<token>1</token>
</place>
<place>
<pname>2</pname>
<token>0</token>
</place>
<!−− Trans i t i on d e f i n i t i o n −−>
<t r a n s i t i o n>
<tname>1</tname>
<pfrom>1</pfrom>
<pto>2</pto>
<pto>3</pto>
</t r a n s i t i o n>
<t r a n s i t i o n>
<tname>2</tname>
<pfrom>2</pfrom>
<pfrom>4</pfrom>
<pto>5</pto>
</t r a n s i t i o n>
</pe t r in e t>
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Chapter 7
Test Results
By using the methodologies that we introduced in previous chapters, we verify the
security and performance of Kerberos, PERMIS, and Shibboleth. The purpose of the se-
curity test is to ensure the authentication between the client and every service entity. The
purpose of the performance test is finding deadlocks and livelocks in each protocol.
7.1 Security test result
We inject possible malicious attacks in the Casper scripts. The table 7.1, 7.2, and
7.3 shows summary of the attacks and test results. From the test, we found no security
vulnerability on the protocols against the attacks we injected. Detailed results of each
security tool can be found in appendix A.
7.1.1 Performance Test Results
We have checked whether Kerberos, PERMIS, or Shibboleth has any livelock or
deadlock on its protocol by analyzing each Petri net. The Petri net graph of each security
tool can be found in appendix B. Also, Karp Miller trees of Kerberos, PERMIS, and Shibbo-
leth generated with two initial tokens can be found in appendix C. Since we cannot perform
bottleneck tests with current test tool, we cannot define the number of initial tokens in the
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Table 7.1: Security Test result of Kerberos
Protocol Test Type Test Spec. Result
Kerberos Timed Agreement Test TimedAgreement(C, TGS, 2, []) OK
TimedAgreement(C, DS, 2, []) OK
Agreement Test Agreement(C, AS, []) OK
Agreement(AS, C, []) OK
Agreement(TGS, C, []) OK
C: Client, AS: Authentication Server, TGS: Ticket Granting Server
Table 7.2: Security Test result of PERMIS
Protocol Test Type Test Spec. Result
PERMIS Secrecy Test Secret(SPDP,rsc,[CIS, CPEP]) OK
Secret(CIS,wst,[SPDP, CPEP]) OK
Secret(CPEP, rsc, [TPEP]) OK
Secret(CPEP, wst, [CVS]) OK
Secret(OPDP, rsc, [TPEP, CPEP]) OK
Secret(OPDP, na, [CPEP, TPEP]) OK
Agreement Test Agreement(SPDP, CIS,[]) OK
CPEP: Client Policy Enforcement Point, SPDP: Subject Policy Decision Point
TPEP: Target Policy Enforcement Point, OPDP: Object Policy Decision Point
CIS: Credential Issuing Server, CVS: Credential Verification Server
Table 7.3: Security Test result of Shibboleth
Protocol Test Type Test Spec. Result
Shibboleth Secrecy Test Secret(SP,na,[IP]) OK
Secret(IP,nb,[SP]) OK
Agreement Test Agreement(SP, IP,[]) OK
Agreement(IP, SP,[]) OK
SP: Service Provider, IP: Identity Provider
worst condition. Therefore, we have performed the deadlock and livelock test five times for
each protocol with different number of initial tokens. The table 7.4 shows the summary of
58
the test results.
Table 7.4: Livelock and Deadlock Test Results
Protocol Test Type Token 1 2 3 4 5
Kerberos Livelock No No No No No
Deadlock No No No No No
PERMIS Livelock No No No No No
Deadlock No No No No No
Shibboleth Livelock No No No No No
Deadlock No No No No No
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
We have introduced distributed authentication and authorization protocols for the
security of distributed file systems. We examined details of the background knowledge on
test tools and various distributed authentication and authorization tools.
We showed how Casper, CSP, and FDR can be used for the security verification of
distributed authentication and authorization tools. We newly implemented the performance
verification software based on Petri nets and Karp Miller tree analysis, and showed the
security and performance test results of Kerberos, Shibboleth, and PERMIS by using the
software tools. From the test results we found no security issue nor performance lack.
However, we haven’t finished bottleneck test yet since the test requires measuring real
execution time of each protocol.
The next step of this study is finding bottlenecks of each security tool, and apply
the test methodologies to more distributed authentication and authorization tools.
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Appendix A Security Test Results on FDR
A.1 Kerberos
Sta r t i ng FDR
Checking /mnt/ hg f s /Documents/03 Research /03 CU/03 P2PFileSystem/03 Casper−FDR
/01 Kerberos /Kerberos1of2 . csp
Checking a s s e r t i o n AUTH1M: : AuthenticateINITIATORToSERVERAgreement [T= AUTH1M
: : SYSTEM 1
No attack found
Checking a s s e r t i o n AUTH2M: : AuthenticateSERVERToINITIATORAgreement [T= AUTH2M
: : SYSTEM 2
No attack found
Checking a s s e r t i o n AUTH3M: : AuthenticateINITIATORToRESPONDERTimedAgreement2 [T
= AUTH3M: : SYSTEM 3
No attack found
Checking a s s e r t i o n STOP [T= SYSTEM\ d i f f ( Events , { | INTRUDERM: : v e r i f y | } )
No attack found
Done
S ta r t i ng FDR
Checking /mnt/ hg f s /Documents/03 Research /03 CU/03 P2PFileSystem/03 Casper−FDR
/01 Kerberos /Kerberos2of2 . csp
Checking a s s e r t i o n AUTH1M: : AuthenticateSERVERToINITIATORAgreement [T= AUTH1M
: : SYSTEM 1
No attack found
Checking a s s e r t i o n AUTH2M: : AuthenticateINITIATORToRESPONDERTimedAgreement2 [T
= AUTH2M: : SYSTEM 2
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No attack found
Checking a s s e r t i o n STOP [T= SYSTEM\ d i f f ( Events , { | INTRUDERM: : v e r i f y | } )
No attack found
Done
A.2 PERMIS
Sta r t i ng FDR
Checking /home/madtosh/Documents/03 Research /03 CU/03 P2PFileSystem/03 Casper−
FDR/02 Permis / Fina l /Permis1of3 . csp
Checking a s s e r t i o n SECRETM: : SECRET SPEC [T= SECRETM: : SYSTEM S
No attack found
Checking a s s e r t i o n SECRETM: : SEQ SECRET SPEC [T= SECRETM: : SYSTEM S SEQ
No attack found
Checking a s s e r t i o n AUTH1M: : AuthenticateSERVERToRESPONDERAgreement [T= AUTH1M
: : SYSTEM 1
No attack found
Done
S ta r t i ng FDR
Checking /home/madtosh/Documents/03 Research /03 CU/03 P2PFileSystem/03 Casper−
FDR/02 Permis / Fina l /Permis2of3 . csp
Checking a s s e r t i o n SECRETM: : SECRET SPEC [T= SECRETM: : SYSTEM S
No attack found
Checking a s s e r t i o n SECRETM: : SEQ SECRET SPEC [T= SECRETM: : SYSTEM S SEQ
No attack found
Done
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Sta r t i ng FDR
Checking /home/madtosh/Documents/03 Research /03 CU/03 P2PFileSystem/03 Casper−
FDR/02 Permis / Fina l /Permis3of3 . csp
Checking a s s e r t i o n SECRETM: : SECRET SPEC [T= SECRETM: : SYSTEM S
No attack found
Checking a s s e r t i o n SECRETM: : SEQ SECRET SPEC [T= SECRETM: : SYSTEM S SEQ
No attack found
Done
A.3 Shibboleth
Sta r t i ng FDR
Checking /home/madtosh/Documents/03 Research /03 CU/03 P2PFileSystem/03 Casper−
FDR/03 Sh ibbo l e th / Shibbo le th . csp
Checking a s s e r t i o n SECRETM: : SECRET SPEC [T= SECRETM: : SYSTEM S
No attack found
Checking a s s e r t i o n SECRETM: : SEQ SECRET SPEC [T= SECRETM: : SYSTEM S SEQ
No attack found
Checking a s s e r t i o n AUTH1M: : AuthenticateRESPONDERToSERVERAgreement [T= AUTH1M
: : SYSTEM 1
No attack found
Checking a s s e r t i o n AUTH2M: : AuthenticateSERVERToRESPONDERAgreement [T= AUTH2M
: : SYSTEM 2
No attack found
Done
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Appendix B Petri Net Graphs
B.1 Kerberos
Client
Auth Request
Session Key...
Authentication
Server Buffer
Verification
Decryption
Verification
Encryption
Auth Request
Session Key...
Verification
Decryption
Verification
Encryption
Auth Request
Session Key...
Verification
Decryption
Verification
Encryption
Ticket Granting
Server Buffer
Service Server
Buffer
65
B.2 PERMIS
Client
Authorization
Request
Credential Request
Subject PDP
Verification
Decryption
Verification
Encryption
Credential
Request
Credentials
Verification
Decryption
Verification
Encryption
Credential
Issuing Server
Authorization
Request
Target PEP
Verification
Decryption
Verification
Encryption
Credential
Validation
Request
Credentials
Verification
Decryption
Verification
Encryption
Credential
Validation
Server
Access Control
Request
Access Control
Decision
Verification
Decryption
Verification
Encryption
Object PDP
Decryption
Verification
Encryption
66
B.3 Shibboleth
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Appendix C Karp-Miller Trees Graphs
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Figure 1: Karp-Miller Tree of Kerberos with Two initial tokens
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C.2 PERMIS
m0
m1
T1
m2
T1
m3
T2
m4
T2
T1
m5
T3
m6
T3
T1
m7
T4
m8
T2
m9
T4
T1
m10
T5
m11
T3
m12
T4
T2
m13
T5 T1
m14
T6
m15
T4
T3
m16
T5 T2
m17
T6 T1
m18
T7
m19
T4
m20
T5
T3
m21
T6 T2
m22
T7 T1
m23
T8
m24
T5
T4
m25
T6 T3
m26
T7 T2
m27
T8 T1
m28
T9
m29
T5
m30
T6
T4
m31
T7 T3
m32
T8 T2
m33
T9
T1
m34
T10
m35
T6
T5
m36
T7 T4
m37
T8 T3
m38
T9
T2
m39
T10T1
m40
T11
m41
T7
T5
m42
T8 T4
m43
T9
T3
m44
T10T2
m45
T11T1
m46
T12
m47
T6
m48
T8
T5
m49
T9
T4
m50
T10T3
m51
T11T2
m52
T12T1
m53
T13
m54
T7
m55
T8
T6
m56
T9
T5
m57
T10T4
m58
T11T3
m59
T12T2
m60
T13T1
m61
T14
m62
T8
T7
m63
T9
T6
m64
T10T5
m65
T11T4
m66
T12T3
m67
T13T2
m68
T14T1
m69
T15
m70
T8
m71
T9
T7
m72
T10T6
m73
T11T5
m74
T12T4
m75
T13T3
m76
T14T2
m77
T15T1
m78
T16
m79
T9
T8
m80
T10T7
m81
T11T6
m82
T12T5
m83
T13T4
m84
T14T3
m85
T15T2
m86
T16T1
m87
T17
m88
T9
m89
T10
T8
m90
T11T7
m91
T12T6
m92
T13T5
m93
T14T4
m94
T15T3
m95
T16T2
m96
T17T1
m97
T18
m98
T10
T9
m99
T11T8
m100
T12T7
m101
T13T6
m102
T14T5
m103
T15T4
m104
T16T3
m105
T17T2
m106
T18T1
m107
T20
m108
T11
T9
m109
T12T8
m110
T13T7
m111
T14T6
m112
T15T5
m113
T16T4
m114
T17T3
m115
T18T2
m116
T20
T19
T1
m117
T12
T9
m118
T13T8
m119
T14T7
m120
T15T6
m121
T16T5
m122
T17T4
m123
T18T3
m124
T20
T19
T2
m125
T13
T9
m126
T14T8
m127
T15T7
m128
T16T6
m129
T17T5
m130
T18T4
m131
T20T19 T3
m132
T14
T9
m133
T15T8
m134
T16T7
m135
T17T6
m136
T18T5
m137
T20T19 T4
m138
T15
T9
m139
T16T8
m140
T17T7
m141
T18T6
m142
T20T19 T5
m143
T16
T9
m144
T17T8
m145
T18T7
m146
T20T19 T6
m147
T17
T9
m148
T18T8
m149
T20T19 T7
m150
T18
T9
m151
T20T19 T8
m152
T20
T19
T9
T19
m153
T10
T19
m154
T11
T19
m155
T12
T19
m156
T13
T19
m157
T14
T19
m158
T15
T19
m159
T16
T19
m160
T17
T19
m161
T18
T19
m162
T20
T19
Figure 2: Karp-Miller Tree of PERMIS with Two initial tokens
69
C.3 Shibboleth
m0
m1
T1
m2
T1
m3
T2
m4
T2
T1
m5
T3
m6
T3
T1
m7
T4
m8
T2
m9
T4
T1
m10
T5
m11
T3
m12
T4
T2
m13
T5T1
m14
T6
m15
T4
T3
m16
T5T2
m17
T6T1
m18
T7
m19
T4
m20
T5
T3
m21
T6T2
m22
T7T1
m23
T8
m24
T5
T4
m25
T6T3
m26
T7T2
m27
T8
T1
m28
T9
m29
T5
m30
T6
T4
m31
T7T3
m32
T8
T2
m33
T9 T1
m34
T2
m35
T6
T5
m36
T7T4
m37
T8
T3
m38
T9 T2 T1
m39
T3
m40
T7
T5
m41
T8
T4
m42
T9 T3
T10
T1
m43
T6
m44
T8
T5
m45
T9
T10
T4
m46
T2
m47
T7
m48
T8
T6
m49
T9 T5
m50
T2 T10T4
m51
T3
m52
T8
T7
m53
T9 T6
m54
T2 T5
m55
T3 T10T4
m56
T8
m57
T9
T7
m58
T2 T6
m59
T3 T10T5
m60
T9
T8
m61
T2 T7
m62
T3 T10T6
m63
T2
m64
T9
T8
m65
T3 T10T7
m66
T3
m67
T9 T2
T10
T8
T10
m68
T9 T3
T10
m69
T2
T10
m70
T3
T10
Figure 3: Karp-Miller Tree of Shibboleth with Two initial tokens
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Appendix D Casper Scripts
D.1 Kerberos (1 of 2)
−− Kerberos 5 p ro to co l ( part 1/2) by Seok B. Yun
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− Purpose : keep sec racy between AS<−>TGS<−>DS
−− Abbrev iat ions
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− C : c l i e n t
−− DS : Data Server
−− TGS : Ticket Granting Server
−− AS : Authent i cat ion Server
−− Addr : address ( not used )
−− L i f e : l i f e t im e o f t i c k e t ( not used )
−− Key(x ) : x ’ s p r i va t e key
−− Kxy : Se s s i on Key f o r x and y
−− Txy : x ’ s t i c k e t to use y
−− Ax : Authent icator f o r x
−− Ticket De f i n i t i o n
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− {DS, C, Addr , timestamp , l i f e , Ksc}Key(DS)
−− Authent icator De f i n i t i o n
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− {C, Addr , timestamp}Ksc
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− CODE STARTS −−
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
#Protoco l d e s c r i p t i o n
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−− 1 . Gett ing TGS t i c k e t (C <−> AS)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
0 . −> C : AS, TGS
1 . C −> AS : C, TGS
2 . AS −> C : {C, TGS, ts1 , kct }{SKey(TGS) } % Tct
3 . AS −> C : { kct }{SKey(C) }
−− 2 . Request ing a Se rv i c e t i c k e t s (C −> TGS)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
4 . C −> TGS : Tct % {C, TGS, ts1 , kct }{SKey(TGS) }
[ t s1==now or t s1+1==now ]
5 . C −> TGS : {C, t s2 }{ kct }
[ t s2==now or t s2+1==now ]
#Free v a r i a b l e s
C, AS, TGS : Agent
SKey : Agent −> SecretKey
kct : SessionKey
ts1 , t s2 : TimeStamp
−−va : Nonce
InverseKeys = (SKey , SKey) , ( kct , kct )
#Proce s s e s
INITIATOR(C) knows SKey(C)
RESPONDER(TGS) knows SKey(TGS)
SERVER(AS) knows SKey(C) , SKey(TGS) gene ra t e s kct
#Sp e c i f i c a t i o n
Agreement (C, AS, [ ] )
Agreement (AS, C, [ ] )
TimedAgreement (C, TGS, 2 , [ ] )
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#Actual v a r i a b l e s
Cl ient , AuthServer , TGServer , Mallory : Agent
Kct : Sess ionKey
−−Va : Nonce
TimeStamp = 0 . . 3
MaxRunTime = 2
InverseKeys = (Kct , Kct )
#Functions
symbol ic SKey
#System
INITIATOR( Cl i en t )
RESPONDER(TGServer )
RESPONDER(AuthServer )
#Int ruder In format ion
Int ruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Cl ient , Mallory , AuthServer , SKey(Mallory ) }
Guessable = SessionKey
Crackable = SessionKey
Crackable = SecretKey
Crackable = Password
D.2 Kerberos (2 of 2)
−− Kerberos 5 p ro to co l ( part 2/2) by Seok B. Yun
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− Purpose : keep sec racy between AS<−>TGS<−>DS
−− Abbrev iat ions
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− C : c l i e n t
−− DS : Data Server
−− TGS : Ticket Granting Server
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−− AS : Authent icat ion Server
−− Addr : address ( not used )
−− L i f e : l i f e t im e o f t i c k e t ( not used )
−− Key(x ) : x ’ s p r i va t e key
−− Kxy : Se s s i on Key f o r x and y
−− Txy : x ’ s t i c k e t to use y
−− Ax : Authent icator f o r x
−− Ticket De f i n i t i o n
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− {DS, C, Addr , timestamp , l i f e , Ksc}Key(DS)
−− Authent icator De f i n i t i o n
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− {C, Addr , timestamp}Ksc
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− CODE STARTS −−
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
#Protoco l d e s c r i p t i o n
−− 3 . Gett ing Se rv i c e Ticket s (C <− TGS)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
0 . −> C : kct , DS
1 . −> TGS : C, DS, kct
3 . TGS −> C : {C, DS, ts1 , kcs }{SKey(DS) } % Tcs
4 . TGS −> C : { kcs }{ kct }
−− 4 . Request ing a Data Se rv i c e
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
5 . C −> DS : Tcs % {C, DS, ts1 , kcs }{SKey(DS) }
[ t s1==now or t s1+1==now ]
6 . C −> DS : {C, t s2 }{ kcs }
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[ t s2==now or t s2+1==now ]
#Free v a r i a b l e s
C, TGS, DS : Agent
SKey : Agent −> SecretKey
kct , kcs : SessionKey
ts1 , t s2 : TimeStamp
InverseKeys = (SKey , SKey) , ( kct , kct ) , ( kcs , kcs )
#Proce s s e s
INITIATOR(C) knows SKey(C)
RESPONDER(DS) knows SKey(DS)
SERVER(TGS) knows SKey(DS) gene ra t e s kcs
#Sp e c i f i c a t i o n
Agreement (TGS, C, [ ] )
TimedAgreement (C, DS, 2 , [ ] )
#Actual v a r i a b l e s
Cl ient , TGServer , DataServer , Mallory : Agent
Kct , Kcs : SessionKey
TimeStamp = 0 . . 3
MaxRunTime = 2
InverseKeys = (Kct , Kct ) , (Kcs , Kcs )
#Functions
symbol ic SKey
#System
INITIATOR( Cl i en t )
RESPONDER( DataServer )
RESPONDER(TGServer )
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#Intruder In format ion
Int ruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Cl ient , Mallory , TGServer , DataServer , SKey( Mallory ) }
Guessable = SessionKey
Crackable = SessionKey
Crackable = SecretKey
Crackable = Password
D.3 PERMIS (1 of 3)
−− Permis Author i zat ion p ro to co l ( part 1/3) by Seok B. Yun
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− Purpose : keep sec racy between SPDP<−>CIS
−− Al l p ro to co l should be undertaken by TLS/SSL
−− Abbrev iat ions
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− CPEP : C l i en t PEP
−− SPDP : Subject PDP
−− CIS : Credent i a l I s s u i n g Server
−− TPEP : Target PEP
−− r s c : r e s ou r c e f i e l d ( Att r ibute id , value , data type )
−− wst : WS−TRUST token
−− PK(x ) : x ’ s pub l i c key
−− SK(x ) : x ’ s s e c r e t key
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− CODE STARTS −−
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
#Protoco l d e s c r i p t i o n
−− 1 . Author i zat ion Request (CPEP <−> SPDP)
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
0 . −> CPEP : SPDP
1 . CPEP −> SPDP : {SPDP, r s c }{PK(SPDP) }
2 . −> SPDP : CIS
3 . SPDP −> CPEP : { rsc , SPDP, f ( rsc , SPDP) }{PK(CIS ) } % cred1 , CIS
−− 2 . Credent i a l Request (CPEP <−> CIS )
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
4 . CPEP −> CIS : cred1 % { rsc , SPDP, f ( rsc , SPDP) }{PK(CIS ) }
5 . −> CIS : wst , TPEP
6 . CIS −> CPEP : { f ( wst , CIS ) }{PK(TPEP) } % wstrusthash
#Free v a r i a b l e s
CPEP, SPDP, CIS , TPEP: Agent
f : HashFunction
rsc , wst : Nonce
PK: Agent −> PublicKey
SK: Agent −> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (PK, SK)
#Proce s s e s
INITIATOR(CPEP, r s c ) knows PK, SK(CPEP)
RESPONDER(CIS , wst ) knows PK, SK(CIS )
SERVER(SPDP) knows PK, SK(SPDP)
#Sp e c i f i c a t i o n
Sec r e t (SPDP, rsc , [ CIS , CPEP] )
Sec r e t (CIS , wst , [ SPDP, CPEP] )
−− Agreement between Subject PDP and Credent i a l I s s u i n g Server
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Agreement (SPDP, CIS , [ ] )
#Actual v a r i a b l e s
77
ClientPEP , SubjectPDP , CredIS , Mallory : Agent
Rsc , Wst : Nonce
#Functions
symbol ic PK, SK
#System
INITIATOR(ClientPEP , Rsc )
RESPONDER(CredIS , Wst)
SERVER(SubjectPDP )
#Int ruder In format ion
Int ruder=Mallory
IntruderKnowledge={ClientPEP , SubjectPDP , CredIS , Mallory }
D.4 PERMIS (2 of 3)
−− Permis Author i zat ion p ro to co l ( part 2/3) by Seok B. Yun
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− Purpose : keep sec racy between CPEP<−>CVS
−− Al l p ro to co l should be undertaken by TLS/SSL
−− Abbrev iat ions
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− CPEP : C l i en t PEP
−− CVS : Credent i a l Va l idat i on Server
−− TPEP : Target PEP
−− r s c : r e s ou r c e f i e l d ( Att r ibute id , value , data type )
−− wst : WS−TRUST token
−− PK(x ) : x ’ s pub l i c key
−− SK(x ) : x ’ s s e c r e t key
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− CODE STARTS −−
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
#Protoco l d e s c r i p t i o n
−− 3 . Author i zat ion Request (CPEP <−> TPEP)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
0 . −> CPEP : TPEP, rsc , wst , CIS , CVS, f (wst , CIS )
1 . CPEP −> TPEP : { rsc , CPEP}{PK(TPEP) }
2 . CPEP −> TPEP : { f ( wst , CIS ) }{PK(CVS) } % wstrusthash
−− 4 . Credent i a l Request (TPEP <−> CVS)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
3 . −> TPEP : CVS
4 . −> CVS : wst , CIS , na
5 . TPEP −> CVS : wstrusthash % { f ( wst , CIS ) }{PK(CVS) }
7 . CVS −> TPEP : {na}{PK(TPEP) }
#Free v a r i a b l e s
CPEP, TPEP, CVS, CIS : Agent
f : HashFunction
rsc , wst , na : Nonce
PK: Agent −> PublicKey
SK: Agent −> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (PK, SK)
#Proce s s e s
INITIATOR(CPEP) knows PK, SK(CPEP)
RESPONDER(CVS) knows PK, SK(CVS)
SERVER(TPEP) knows PK, SK(TPEP)
#Sp e c i f i c a t i o n
Sec r e t (CPEP, rsc , [TPEP] )
Sec r e t (CPEP, wst , [CVS] )
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#Actual v a r i a b l e s
ClientPEP , TargetPEP , CredVS , CredIS , Mallory : Agent
Rsc , Wst , Na : Nonce
#Functions
symbol ic PK, SK
#System
INITIATOR(ClientPEP )
RESPONDER(CredVS)
SERVER(TargetPEP)
#Int ruder In format ion
Int ruder=Mallory
IntruderKnowledge={ClientPEP , TargetPEP , CredVS , Mallory }
D.5 PERMIS (3 of 3)
−− Permis Author i zat ion p ro to co l ( part 2/3) by Seok B. Yun
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− Purpose : keep sec racy between CPEP<−>CVS
−− Al l p ro to co l should be undertaken by TLS/SSL
−− Abbrev iat ions
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− CPEP : C l i en t PEP
−− TPEP : Target PEP
−− OPDP : Object PDP
−− r s c : r e s ou r c e f i e l d ( Att r ibute id , value , data type )
−− wst : WS−TRUST token
−− PK(x ) : x ’ s pub l i c key
−− SK(x ) : x ’ s s e c r e t key
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− CODE STARTS −−
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
#Protoco l d e s c r i p t i o n
−− 5 . S e rv i c e Request (CPEP −> TPEP −> OPDP)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
0 . −> CPEP : TPEP, r s c
1 . CPEP −> TPEP : { rsc , CPEP}{PK(TPEP) }
2 . −> TPEP : OPDP
3 . −> OPDP : na
4 . TPEP −> OPDP : { rsc , CPEP}{PK(OPDP) }
−− 6 . S e rv i c e Enable (CPEP −> TPEP −> OPDP)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
5 . OPDP −> TPEP : {na , CPEP}{PK(TPEP) }
6 . TPEP −> CPEP : {na}{PK(CPEP) }
#Free v a r i a b l e s
CPEP, TPEP, OPDP : Agent
rsc , na : Nonce
PK: Agent −> PublicKey
SK: Agent −> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (PK, SK)
#Proce s s e s
INITIATOR(CPEP) knows PK, SK(CPEP)
RESPONDER(OPDP, r s c ) knows PK, SK(OPDP)
SERVER(TPEP) knows PK, SK(TPEP)
#Sp e c i f i c a t i o n
Sec r e t (OPDP, rsc , [TPEP, CPEP] )
Sec r e t (OPDP, na , [CPEP, TPEP] )
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#Actual v a r i a b l e s
ClientPEP , TargetPEP , ObjectPDP , Mallory : Agent
Rsc , Na : Nonce
#Functions
symbol ic PK, SK
#System
INITIATOR(ClientPEP )
RESPONDER(ObjectPDP , Rsc )
SERVER(TargetPEP)
#Int ruder In format ion
Int ruder=Mallory
IntruderKnowledge={ClientPEP , TargetPEP , ObjectPDP , Mallory }
D.6 Shibboleth
−− Shibbo leth p ro to co l by Seok B. Yun
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− Just cook i e i s used f o r a l l .
−− Abbrev iat ions
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− C : Cl i en t
−− SP : Se rv i c e Provider
−− IP : I d en t i t y Provider
−− PK(x ) : x ’ s pub l i c key
−− SK(x ) : x ’ s s e c r e t key
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− CODE STARTS −−
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
#Protoco l d e s c r i p t i o n
0 . −> C : SP
1 . C −> SP : {SP , na}{PK(SP) }
2 . −> SP : IP
3 . SP −> C : {na , SP , f ( na , SP) }{PK( IP ) } % cookie1 , IP
4 . C −> IP : cook i e1 % {na , SP , f ( na , SP) }{PK( IP ) }
5 . −> IP : nb
6 . IP −> C : {nb , IP , f (nb , IP ) }{PK(SP) } % cook ie2
7 . C −> SP : cook i e2 % {nb , IP , f (nb , IP ) }{PK(SP) }
#Free v a r i a b l e s
C, SP , IP : Agent
f : HashFunction
na , nb : Nonce
PK: Agent −> PublicKey
SK: Agent −> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (PK, SK)
#Proce s s e s
INITIATOR(C, na ) knows PK, SK(C)
RESPONDER(SP , nb) knows PK, SK(SP)
SERVER( IP ) knows PK, SK( IP )
#Sp e c i f i c a t i o n
Sec r e t (SP , na , [ IP ] )
Sec r e t ( IP , nb , [ SP ] )
Agreement (SP , IP , [ ] )
Agreement ( IP , SP , [ ] )
#Actual v a r i a b l e s
Cl ient , Se rv i ceProv ider , Ident i tyProv ide r , Mallory : Agent
Na , Nb: Nonce
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#Functions
symbol ic PK, SK
#System
INITIATOR( Cl ient , Na)
RESPONDER( Serv i ceProv ider , Nb)
SERVER( Iden t i t yProv ide r )
#Int ruder In format ion
Int ruder=Mallory
IntruderKnowledge={Cl ient , Se rv i ceProv ider , Ident i tyProv ide r , Mallory }
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